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Inquiry & Analysis-Iran/ Saudi Arabia/ U.S. and the Middle East
January11, 2008
No. 1809

The Collapse of the Saudi Sunni Bloc against Iran's Aspirations for Regional
Hegemony in the Gulf

By Y. Yehoshua, I. Rapoport, Y. Mansharof, A. Savyon and Y. Carmon*

To view this Inquiry and Analysis in HTML, visit:
www.memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=IA41608 .

The Disintegration of the Saudi Sunni Bloc

For the past two years, the Gulf states have been part of a Sunni bloc
established by Saudi Arabia to counter Iran's aspirations for regional
hegemony. During this period, Saudi Arabia made efforts to distance Iran
from "Arab affairs," while the Gulf states were already in political
conflict with Iran over the issue of the three islands (Greater and Lesser
Tunb, and Abu Moussa) that Iran had forcefully seized from the UAE in 1971,
and following recent statements by senior Iranian leaders threatening
Bahrain's sovereignty.(1) Some in Saudi Arabia even called on the Gulf
states to form a military alliance against Iran.(2) This Gulf policy
vis--vis Iran was in line with U.S. efforts to isolate it in both the
regional and the international arenas.

Qatar is the only Gulf state that has refrained from cooperating with the
Saudi-Gulf bloc. In fact, for the past decade, it has consistently taken an
anti-Saudi line, and has allied itself with the opposing Iranian-Syrian
axis. As part of this axis, it supported Hizbullah in the U.N. Security
Council by working to block Resolution 1701, and, unlike other GCC states,
it refrained from condemning the Hamas takeover of Gaza. Qatar also made
efforts to prevent the isolation of Syria by being the only Arab country to
abstain in the vote over Security Council Resolution 1737 that would
establish an international tribunal for the Al-Hariri assassination. In
addition, the Qatari government TV station Al-Jazeera consistently attacked
Saudi Arabia and supported Iran and Syria, as well as their proxies
Hizbullah and Hamas.

The Saudi-Gulf bloc collapsed about six weeks ago when Qatar, in an
unprecedented move and without consulting the other Gulf states, invited
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to attend the summit of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) in Doha. (The Saudi magazine Al-Majalla called
this collapse "the end of the American game."(3)) The Gulf states, surprised
but acquiescent, accepted this Iranian-Qatari dictate, albeit grudgingly -
despite the fact that Iran had not made any placatory statements regarding
its nuclear program, the issue of the three islands, or the threats recently
made by Iranian leaders against Bahrain.

The disintegration of the bloc was also the result of two additional
factors. The first was the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate report,
released by President Bush during the GCC summit, which assessed that Iran
had suspended its nuclear weapons program. The report, which lifted the
threat of an American military attack on Iran, was publicly seen as an
Iranian victory, and allowed Iran to take a more aggressive political tack
vis--vis the Gulf states. As part of this, Ahmadinejad presented at the GCC
summit a 12-point program of Iranian-Gulf economic and military cooperation.

The second factor contributing to the collapse of the bloc was the growing
concern in the Gulf that the very publication of the NIE report, as well as
the U.S.-Iran negotiations over the Iraqi issue, indicated a shift in U.S.
policy towards an understanding with Iran, which would come at the expense
of the Gulf states' interests.

Though the Gulf states responded coolly to Ahmadinejad's proposals at the
summit, and though they protested that, in his speech, he had failed to
allay their concerns over Iran's aspirations for regional hegemony, and had
referred to the Gulf as "Persian" rather than "Arabian," the Iranian
president did manage to achieve his aim; at the summit, several senior Gulf
officials spoke of strengthening relations with Iran.

The American reaction to the collapse of the Saudi-Gulf bloc was to dispatch
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates to the Gulf for an immediate visit,
during which he repeated his call to the Gulf states to unite and to force
Iran to freeze its uranium enrichment.

The Saudi reaction to the collapse, on the other hand, was hesitant and
unclear. By inviting Ahmadinejad to the summit, Qatar had breached its
agreement with Saudi Arabia to refrain from steps that go against the
consensus within the Arab League.(4) But despite this, Saudi Foreign
Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal expressed support for the invitation;
moreover, following the summit, Saudi King 'Abdallah invited Ahmadinejad to
attend the Hajj ceremonies in Mecca. The only Saudi criticism of
Ahmadinejad's invitation to the GCC summit came from the editor of the Saudi
pan-Arab daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Tariq Alhomayed.(5)

The collapse of the Saudi-Gulf bloc did not change the Gulf states' position
towards the U.S. Nor can Iran attain real hegemony over the region at the
present time, due to its precarious economic situation, and due to the fact
that the Gulf states' governments are predominantly Arab and Sunni.
Nevertheless, spokesmen for the Iranian regime have capitalized on the
events of the past two months, presenting them as a historic turning point
in Iran-Gulf relations, as a change in the political power balance in the
Gulf, and as a significant achievement of Ahmadinejad's foreign policy,
which, they said, had proven that Iran cannot be isolated in either the
regional or the international arena.

The disintegration of the Saudi-Gulf front may impact the future willingness
of the Gulf states to be part of a pro-American front in the region. Voices
in the Gulf have expressed concern over the inconsistency of U.S. policy,
and have questioned whether the Gulf states can rely on the defense of the
U.S., suggesting that these states should have an independent policy towards
Iran, rather than being aligned solely with the U.S.(6)

The Qatari Role in the Collapse of the Saudi-Gulf Bloc

Qatar and Iran attempted to obscure the circumstances of Ahmadinejad's
invitation to the GCC summit, but it soon became clear that the invitation
had been extended by Qatar in response to a request by Iran, and without
consulting the rest of the Gulf states. During the first day of the summit,
Ahmadinejad said at a press conference that he had come on an official
invitation by Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Aal Thani, and added:
"What difference does it make if one requests to be present [at the summit]
or if one receives an invitation? The important thing is that we are here
and that we are taking part in the summit."(7)

Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jasim bin Jaber Aal Thani said that
the invitation had been extended "as part of the effort to conduct a
constructive dialogue with an important neighbor," and that forging stable
relations with Iran would serve the interests of the Gulf states.(8) He
added: "I do not believe that we can solve our problems by cutting Iran off
from the region, since it is an important player."(9)

Throughout the summit, Qatar continued its effort to moderate the furious
reactions of some Gulf states to Ahmadinejad's invitation. To allay the
anger of the UAE leaders, Qatar arranged a meeting between the UAE president
and his Iranian counterpart, as well as between the foreign ministers of the
two countries.(10) Furthermore, Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jasim
defended Ahmadinejad's use of the term "Persian Gulf" rather than "Arabian
Gulf" in his speech at the GCC summit, stating that "the Arabian Gulf has
historically been called 'the Persian Gulf,' 'the Arabian Gulf' being a
modern term."(11)

The Qatari media also published articles in praise of the invitation. For
example, columnist Fawwaz Al-'Ajmi wrote in the Qatari daily Al-Sharq: "The
invitation to the Iranian president... was a timely, wise and sensible
[move]... since Iran is a neighboring Muslim country, and the wellbeing and
prosperity of its Muslim people has a positive impact on the peoples of the
Gulf states... [We] have the same enemy, and our goal must also be the
same... Moreover, Iran's vigor is its neighbors' [economic] vigor, and its
military power must support and complement that of its brothers in the

The rest of the Gulf states acquiesced to Qatar's dictate, as evident from
the official statements issued Gulf officials. Bahraini Prime Minister
Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman Aal Khalifa spoke of "Gulf-Iran rapprochement...
which strengthens the security in the region and enhances its
stability."(13) Omani Foreign Minister Yousef bin 'Alawi bin 'Abdallah,
during his visit to Iran, spoke about "a new chapter in cooperation between
Iran and the GCC states."(14)

GCC Secretary-General 'Abd Al-Rahman bin Hamed Al-'Atiyya likewise made
favorable remarks about the latest developments, stating that the Gulf
states would like to "dissociate the military aspect" from Iran's nuclear
issue, and that the GCC was seeking solutions that would lead to security
and stability, as well as to dialogue as a means of resolving the
crisis."(15) Al-'Atiyya further stated that Ahmadinejad's invitation to the
Hajj ceremony pointed to a "genuine desire" on the part of the Gulf states
"to strengthen Islamic solidarity."(16)

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal likewise expressed no
reservations about the invitation, pointing out that the country hosting
[the summit] was free to invite whomever it wished.(17) However, when asked
to comment on the suggestions made by Ahmadinejad at the summit, Al-Faisal
was more circumspect, observing that while they were conducive to economic
cooperation in the region, "other issues which have remained unsolved must
also be taken into consideration, [including] Iran's nuclear dossier and the
UAE islands currently under Iranian occupation - since these are important
issues that form the basis for economic collaboration and [general]
cooperation between Iran and the GCC states."(18)

In contrast to the statements made by the Gulf officials, the Gulf media
published numerous reports of dissatisfaction with Qatar's moves. Al-Siyassa
reported that the majority of Gulf leaders were not happy with the Iranian
president's appearance at the summit, seeing his invitation as a Qatari
attempt to strengthen its ties with Iran at the expense of other Gulf
states.(19) The Foreign Minister of a Gulf state told the London daily
Al-Sharq Al-Awsat: "No one consulted with us... We found out about [the
invitation] from the media." He added that, in the Gulf, there were
reservations concerning Ahmadinejad's participation, "especially since it
had been decided without any preliminary inter-Gulf coordination."(20)
Kuwaiti MP Khudhayr Al-'Anzi told Al-Arabiya TV that Ahmadinejad's presence
at the summit had been "a manipulation that had served Ahmadinejad himself,"
and that "[Ahmadinejad's] speeches about the Persian Gulf were seen as a
provocation."(21) In a similar vein, a Bahraini diplomat told the Kuwaiti
daily Al-Siyassa that it was the UAE leaders who were most outraged by
Ahmadinejad's presence at the summit, in light of the conflict over Iran's
occupation of the three islands.(22)

Al-Sharq Al-Awsat reported that, following the controversy over the Iranian
president's invitation, a closed session had been held during the summit
over the need for an official body that would be in charge of inviting heads
of state to future Gulf summits.(23)

Kuwaiti columnist Nasser Al-'Utaibi wrote in the Kuwaiti daily Al-Siyassa
that Iran's intentions were not clear and that it was not to be trusted:
"...We can still feel the duplicity of Iran's political message.
Ahmadinejad, in his speech [at the summit], unjustifiably repeated [the
term] 'the Persian Gulf.' In addition, he did not mention the issue of the
[three] islands belonging to UAE which are still under Iran's occupation...
The issue of Iran's nuclear program still remains unclear. We cannot
understand why a country rich in oil and natural gas would insist on a
nuclear program, while having enormous energy sources at its disposal... Is
it trying to [develop] a weapon, in order to control the Arab Gulf states?
Is it trying to blackmail the small Gulf states into submitting to its
claims and its policy, as well as its religious, political, ideological and
practical extremism?..."(24)

The Role of the NIE Report in the Collapse of the Saudi-Gulf Bloc

The NIE report, in addition to being perceived as a significant Iranian
victory, removed the threat of a U.S. military attack on Iran, giving rise
to concerns in the Gulf that the report could herald a U.S.-Iranian
understanding which would compromise the safety of the Gulf states.

Columnist Mazen Hammad wrote in the Qatari daily Al-Watan: "It is clear that
there has been an unprecedented breakthrough in the relations between Iran
and the Arab states... This breakthrough was made possible by the decrease
of international pressure on Iran, which came after the NIE exonerated
[Iran] of striving to develop nuclear weapons... Many think that this
exoneration supplies the Gulf states and Egypt with the excuse they need in
order to improve their relations with Teheran... The Gulf states would not
have given Iran all this attention... had they not been convinced that these
steps [i.e. the NIE report] were meant to prepare the ground for dialogue
between Iran and the U.S."(25)

The deputy editor of the Bahraini daily Akhbar Al-Khaleej, Al-Sayyed Zahra,
asked why the Gulf states had changed their attitude towards Iran when the
latter had not changed its policies at all. He presented an analysis which
suggested that the NIE report was one of the reasons for this development:

"What new development caused the change in Arab-Iranian relations? On what
basis has it occurred?... As usual, the Arab governments are giving us, the
Arab citizens, no explanations... Therefore, we have no option but to review
the assessments of the various analysts and of others who are following this

"After the publication of the report by the NIE report... the Arab states
assessed that the time was ripe for greater rapprochement with Iran and for
greater openness [towards it]... The Arab governments assessed that the
publication of the [NIE] report might indicate a possible change in U.S.
policy towards Iran, and this naturally led to greater openness towards this
country on the part of the Arabs."

Zahra expressed a concern that future U.S.-Iran dialogue may come at the
expense of the Gulf states' interests: "We now see America wooing Iran and
invoking the option of diplomatic dialogue [with it], and perhaps even more
than that - an agreement that would resolve the crisis. What exactly is
behind these [new] positions and moves? And what are the Arabs' interests in
this [situation]?... Is it conceivable that, within a couple of days, Iran's
position and role in Iraq has changed so radically? Is it conceivable that,
within a couple of days, Iran has gone from being one of [the forces] that
arm and support the militias [in Iraq] to being [a force] that restrains
[these militias] and helps to stabilize the region?  Of course it is

Iran Celebrates Its Achievement

Iranian leaders boasted of recent steps taken by Iran to improve relations
with the Gulf states, speaking of "a new age of cooperation" and of "a great
leap" in Iran-Gulf relations.(27) President Ahmadinejad stated in a recent
speech: "I hope that this new process [of Gulf-Iran rapprochement] will
expand, benefiting the peoples of the region and keeping the enemies away
from it... Iran has already announced that its participation in the GCC
summit marks the dawning of a new age in inter-region relations..."(28)

Iranian officials stressed that Iran-Gulf rapprochement was a strategic goal
of Iran's. Foreign Ministry Spokesman Mohammed Ali Hosseini stated in his
weekly press briefing that cooperation with the Gulf states was a top
priority in Iran's foreign policy, saying: "Stronger ties [between Iran and
the Gulf states] spell more security, peace, stability and quiet for the
Gulf states."(29) Supreme National Security Council Secretary Said Al-Jalili
said during a visit of the 'Omani foreign minister to Iran that "a Gulf of
friendship" was not just a slogan but an Iranian strategic outlook.(30)

The Iranian daily Kayhan, which is close to Iranian Supreme leader Ali
Khamenei, stated in its December 4, 2007 editorial: "The invitation of
Ahmadinejad to attend the GCC summit... as a special guest conveys two very
important messages to the U.S. and the West. [Firstly, it indicates that]
the isolation of Iran is impossible. Secondly, [it indicates that] America's
effort to form a united Arab front against Iran has failed... Did the
Annapolis circus [manage to] bring about Iran's isolation? Did the Arab
states join America's coalition against Iran?... Ahmadinejad's participation
in the Doha summit... was a clear sign that America's attempt to divide the
countries of the region had failed. We cannot rule out [the possibility]
that America will continue to make every effort to harm and isolate Iran,
but it will never be able to prevent the emergence of Iran as a symbol of
Muslim strength in the Middle East and the world. The path of hostility
towards Iran is becoming narrower every day."(31)

Iranian sources also stated that Iran was emerging as a regional power, and
was being recognized as such by its Sunni Arab neighbors. The head of the
political bureau of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC),
Yadallah Javani, wrote in the weekly Sobh-e Sadeq, the mouthpiece of Iranian
Supreme Leader Khamenei circulated among the IRGC: "Iran's political
handling of its nuclear [program] presents a new model of nuclear [progress]
to the countries of the region. Some of the Arab countries in the Persian
Gulf are officially announcing that they wish to use nuclear power... Iran
[hereby] declares that it is willing to extend any kind of assistance in
order to help in the advancement of the Muslim states, especially in the
[Gulf] region... In these [new] circumstances, the summit of the GCC -
founded 27 years ago with the aim of confronting Iran - feels that a
productive relationship with Iran is the best way to safeguard the interests
of its member-states, and to guarantee the strategic security of the Persian

"Iran's participation in the summit, for the first time in the history of
the GCC, is a turning point in the [history of] the Persian Gulf... The
repeated failures of America's Middle East policy have led the region to a
new stage... An Islamic Middle East is becoming a reality. America's power
in the region is fading... and the age of the American empire in the Middle
East is ending. In parallel to these developments, Iran's power is
growing... so that everyone [now] sees it as the leading power in the Middle
East. Iran's entry into the nuclear club... changes the [power] balance in
the Middle East..."(32)

*Y. Yehoshua is Director of Research at MEMRI; I. Rapoport and Y. Mansharof
are research fellows at MEMRI; A. Savyon is Director of the Iranian Media
Project;  Y. Carmon is President of MEMRI

(1) Resentment towards Iran, especially over its "interference in Arab
affairs," was expressed on several occasions by Saudi Foreign Minister
Prince Saud Al-Faisal. In a March 2007 interview with Newsweek, he reported
that, during a meeting between the two, Saudi King 'Abdallah had bluntly
said to President Ahmadinejad: "You are interfering in Arab affairs...
Whether you deny it or nor, this is creating bad feelings for Iran and we
think you should stop it." Al-Faisal added: "[Iran's] interference in Arab
affairs is creating a backlash in the Arab world and in the Muslim world."
Newsweek (U.S.), March 29, 2007.
(2) Articles in the Gulf press warned against the Iranian threat, and called
on the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to form a united front
against it. Saudi columnist Yousef Al-Kuwailit wrote in the daily Al-Riyadh:
"Why aren't [the Gulf countries] taking any interest in establishing their
own joint [military] force...? Have we forgotten how Saddam Hussein invaded
Kuwait? Have we forgotten the Persian shah's threats to invade Bahrain, and
the reiteration of those same threats by a senior Iranian official just a
few weeks ago? Have we forgotten the dispute between Iran and the UAE over
the [three] islands? The [conflict] has not yet reached alarming
proportions, but we must be careful..." Al-Riyadh (Saudi Arabia), November
1, 2007. For further details on the call to form a military alliance to
repel the Iranian threat, see MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 1769, "Saudi
Columnists Call on Gulf States to Form Anti-Iran Front," November 20, 2007,
(3) Al-Majalla (Saudi Arabia), December 22, 2007.
(4) In a September 2007 meeting with Saudi King 'Abdallah bin 'Abd Al-'Aziz,
Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Aal Thani promised to keep his
country's mediation efforts - especially with regards to Palestine, Iraq and
Lebanon - in line with understandings reached by the GCC and the Arab
League. Al-Jarida (Kuwait), September 25, 2007.
(5) Alhomayed wrote that the invitation was a reward that Ahmadinejad did
not deserve, and added: "Inviting someone like [former Iranian president
Mohammad] Khatami would have been understandable, since he is one of those
who call for dialogue and coexistence. Had they invited someone of
[Expediency Council Chairman Ali Akbar] Hashemi Rafsanjani's caliber, we
might have said that he is a pragmatic leader with whom a political
agreement is possible. Ahmadinejad, however, is the opposite, and inviting
him only [strengthens] him in Iran vis--vis those who claim that he is
placing his country at risk." Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), December 4, 2007.
(6) In an editorial in the UAE daily Al-Ittihad, Columnist Khaled Al-Dakhil
wrote that a feeling is emerging in the Gulf that "the American umbrella of
defense is not providing the necessary stability in the region, but has
actually become a source of instability... There are signs indicating an
expected change in the security strategy of the GCC states."  Al-Ittihad
(UAE), December 12, 2007.

Columnist Dr. 'Abdallah Al-Shaiji likewise described the Gulf states'
concern over the inconsistency of U.S. policy, alongside their fears
regarding Iran's intentions: "...We have the right to be concerned about
[the possibility of a] war, and about [the possibility of an Iran-US.]
agreement... We see Washington's oscillations [in its relations with]
Tehran... first escalating the nuclear [crisis] and then withdrawing [from
its position], warning about the nuclear threat in 2005 and then dismissing
this threat, with great confidence, [in 2007]. [We saw America] wooing
[Iran], warming its relations with it, and negotiating with it over Iraq.
Then [we saw] the failure [of these negotiations] and their [subsequent]
renewal... How long will we continue to be pawns and victims in the great
chess game that Washington is playing in the Middle East with the last
member of the 'Axis of Evil,' which will cease to be regarded [as such]
after the U.S. signs an agreement with it...?" Al-Ittihad (UAE), December
17, 2007.

Saudi Columnist 'Adel Al-Tarifi called on the Gulf states not to be
complacent about the NIE report, and to "reorganize, [step up] their
security and economic cooperation, and exert heavy pressure on Iran..." in
order to defuse the Iranian threat. Al-Riyadh (Saudi Arabia), December 19,

In contrast, others argued that there was no alternative to the alliance
with the U.S. Kuwaiti MP Khudhayr Al-'Anzi said, "In light of the security
situation, which is on the brink of explosion, and the talk about Iran's
progress towards the attainment of nuclear weapons, the Gulf states cannot
afford to abandon their security agreements with the U.S. For who would
[then] protect our oil [wells]? Who would protect the Gulf economy?...
Al-'Arabiya TV, December 4, 2007.

Qatari reformist 'Abd Al-Hamid Al-Ansari wrote in the Kuwaiti daily
Al-Jarida: "The Gulf states are too sensible, wise, and intelligent to
replace someone who has supported them, stood by their side in times of
disaster, assisted them in liberating their lands and in delivering
themselves from the evil neighbor, and supplied them with means of
development and progress... with [Iran]. We must tell Iran clearly and
without embellishments: Your nuclear plants are a threat to both us and
yourselves, and there is no substitute for our Western and American ally."
Al-Jarida (Kuwait), December 10, 2007.

(7) Al-Watan (Saudi Arabia), December 4, 2007.
(8) Al-Raya (Qatar), December 5, 2007.
(9) www.gulfinthemedia.com, December 9, 2007.
(10 )Al-Siyassa (Kuwait), December 5, 2007. A Bahraini diplomat pointed out
that, while the Iranians had described these meetings as "friendly," UAE
sources had refrained from commenting on them, which was a sign of the
Emirates' displeasure.
(11) www.elaph.com December 4, 2007.
(12) Al-Sharq (Qatar), December 4, 2007.
(13) Akhbar Al-Khaleej (Bahrain), December 27, 2007.
(14) IRNA (Iran), December 30, 2007.
(15) Bahrain News Agency, December 10, 2007.
(16) Al-Hayat (London), December 16, 2007.
(17) Al-Watan (Saudi Arabia), December 12, 2007.
(18) Kuwait News Agency (Kuwait), December 11, 2007.
(19) Al-Siyassa (Kuwait), December 5, 2007.
(20) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), December 4, 2007.
(21) Al-Arabiya TV, December 6, 2007.
(22) Al-Siyassa (Kuwait), December 5, 2007.
(23) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), December 5, 2007.
(24) Al-Siyassa (Kuwait), December 7, 2007.
(25) Al-Wata (Qatar), January 2, 2008.
(26) Akhbar Al-Khaleej (Bahrain), January 1, 2008.
(27) Fars (Iran), December 25, 2007.
(28) Kayhan (Iran), December 27, 2007.
(29) IRNA (Iran), December 31, 2007.
(30) IRNA (Iran), December 30, 2007.
(31) Kayhan (Iran), December 4, 2007.
(32) Sobh-e Sadeq (Iran), December 3, 2007.

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